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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Delivery To Imposters May Be Effective:
Apparent Authority Or Estoppel?
Regal Shop Co. v. Legum Co.'
Legum, a wholesale appliances dealer, directed Regal
to return for credit six television sets to the Legum ware-
house. Brown, Regal's truck-driver, transferred the mer-
chandise to two men standing on the platform of Legum's
warehouse and accepted an initialed receipt. Legum had
no record or recollection of the delivery being completed
and sent a bill for the price of the sets. Regal denied that
debt, and claimed a valid delivery. It seems that the two
men were imposters who had converted the sets to their use.
The trial court in holding for Legum, stated that the
"burden of proof was on Regal to show that the goods were
delivered back to Legum in accordance with the agree-
ment". The court was not satisfied that the uncorroborated
testimony of Brown established the fact of delivery by the
preponderance of evidence required to meet this burden of
proof, since Brown could neither describe the men nor
produce a signed receipt. However, the court indicated that
it did not disbelieve Brown, and found as a fact that the
merchandise was left by Brown at the warehouse.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It main-
tained that the issue was whether or not the delivery to the
men inside the Legum warehouse, to which Brown was
directed, constituted delivery to Legum. Accepting the
trial court's finding that Brown did transfer the merchan-
dise at the warehouse to two unknown men the court ap-
plied the rule declared in the English case of Galbraith &
Grant v. Block:'
"A vendor who is told to deliver goods at the pur-
chaser's premises discharges his obligation if he de-
livers them there without negligence to a person appar-
ently having authority to receive them .... If the pur-
chaser has been unfortunate enough to have had access
to his premises obtained by some apparently respect-
able person who takes the goods and signs for them in
his absence, the loss must fall on him, and not on the
innocent carrier or vendor."
The place of delivery was Legum's warehouse and the mode
of delivery was assented to by Legum in directing Brown
1 206 Md. 267, 111 A. 2d 613 (1955).
2 2 K. B. 155, 157 (1922).
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to the place. Hence, the delivery to the imposters was de-
livery to Legum.
The Court of Appeals in the instant case and the English
Court in the Galbraith case reasoned in terms of apparent
authority, a doctrine which holds a principal liable to third
persons for the acts of a purported agent where the prin-
cipal through his manifestations to the third person has led
that third person to believe that he is authorized to so
act. Apparent authority has often been treated as being
synonymous with a similar doctrine of agency by estoppel.
The latest tentative draft of the Restatement of Agency'
sets forth the elements of agency by estoppel as follows:
(a) intentional or negligent conduct by the principal
which creates a situation where,
(b) a third person believes there is an agency and,
(c) relying on such belief he changes his position to
his detriment.
The principal must have breached a duty he owes to a third
person and such breach is effected either by positive repre-
sentations or by an omission of a duty to prevent detriment
to the third person. The situation created by the principal's
actions or omissions are the only reasons for estoppel. The
Maryland Court has declared:
"'When . . the authority ... is one sought to be
deduced from special circumstances of recognition,
acquiescence, or holding out, the principle of estoppel
or something akin to it at least, must be invoked.' ,4
Whether apparent authority and estoppel in agency are two
different doctrines or two different names for the same doc-
trine has been the cause of much discussion.5 The latest
tentative draft of the Restatement of Agency takes the
stand that these are two different distinct doctrines; estop-
pel being the broader rule covering those situations where
there is not sufficient manifestation by the principal to be
classified under apparent authority. Estoppel, however, is
in one respect more limited than apparent authority in that
it requires a change of position while apparent authority
8 RESTATEMENT SECOND, AGENCY, Tentative Draft No. 3, Sec. 8A, April,
1955.
'Abuc Trading Etc. Corp. v. Jennings, 151 Md. 392, 411, 135 A.
166 (1926).
MTECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY (4th ed., 1952), Secs. 85-90. Also for fur-
ther discussions see: Cook, Agency by Estoppel, 5 Col. L. Rev. 36 (1905)
Ewart, Agency by Estoppel, 5 Col. L. Rev. 354 (1905).
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does not. The latest tentative draft indicates that in a case
such as the Regal case, where it is artificial to speak of
manifestation by the principal, apparent authority cannot
apply. Thus, if an agency question at all, it must be con-
sidered under the doctrine of agency by estoppel.
Cases such as the Regal case where the apparent agent
is not an agent at all are relatively rare.6 In Miltenberger v.
Hulett,7 an imposter had access to the defendant's transfer
office and fraudulently received plaintiff's trunk key and
check thereby stealing the trunk's contents. The court said:
"The law is that if a proprietor of a place of business
by negligence permits one who is not his agent to be in
apparent charge, and who assumes to transact the pro-
prietor's business with a patron, the appearances being
such as would lead a man of ordinary care to believe
the imposter was really his agent, he will not be per-
mitted to take advantage of the imposter's lack of
authority."
In an Ohio case,' the defendant was estopped from denying
authority to an imposter who impersonated his hotel clerk
and stole plaintiff's property. The defendant breached his
duty to have someone in authority in the lobby to register
the patrons.
A distinction can be made between cases like those men-
tioned above and one in the category of Livingston v.
Fuhrman. In that case the principal knew of the purported
agent's activities and the situation created by the purported
agent conducting his own business within the principal's
shop. So, also in the Maryland case of Metropolitan Club v.
Hopper, McGraw,"° the principal was estopped to deny that
one who contracted with the plaintiff as his agent was in
fact his agent. The principal's book-keeper had notice of
the possible fraud and her failure to inform her employer
was sufficient negligence for estoppel to apply. The court
declared:
"Whenever the circumstances are such that a party
learns, or is charged with knowledge, that he has been
placed by the wrongful act of a third party in such a
relation with a second party that a reasonable person
would perceive that, if he did not use ordinary care and
'MECHEM, ibid, Sec. 91.
1188 Mo. App. 273, 175 S. W. 111, 112 (1915).
Kanelles v. Locke, 12 Ohio App. 210 (1919).
'37 A. 2d 747 (D. C. Mun. App., 1944).
"153 Md. 666, 139 A. 554 (1927).
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caution in his own conduct with reference to these cir-
cumstances, he would as a natural consequence . . .
cause danger of injury to the property of the second
party, it becomes the duty of the first party to act so as
to avoid such danger."'1
In the latter two cases estoppel can be easily applied be-
cause the negligence of the defendant was definitely estab-
lished. First, the defendant had knowledge that the decep-
tive situation existed, which created a duty to take reason-
able action to protect third persons in the position of the
plaintiff in those cases. Second, he failed to act discharging
that duty. At least in the Metropolitan case, a simple com-
munciation to the plaintiff would have informed him of the
true situation which was all that was necessary.
In the instant case, however, whether classified under
apparent authority or estoppel, liability on the part of
Legum, the receiver, must depend on some fault on his
part; that is, some negligence on the part of the receiver of
the goods is a necessary element under both doctrines. Yet
in the Regal case, and in the Galbraith case upon which
the Court of Appeals in Regal substantially relied, the ques-
tion of the receiver's negligence was not considered. In
Regal, Legum, the receiver did not know of the deceptive
situation. At most, it can be said, perhaps, that he "should"
have known that persons "might" be deceived "if" im-
posters occupied his receiving platform. Communication
of this danger to third persons who might be affected was
not feasible or reasonable.
It is submitted, therefore, that the true ground upon
which the question was decided in both cases was not ap-
parent authority or agency by estoppel, but instead the
rationale rests upon a matter of public policy, where a
fiction of agency by estoppel is created to complete the
delivery between two innocent parties. A presumption of
negligence here seems to be placed upon the receiver when
thieves intervene and steal merchandise from the deliverer.
This presumption should hold, however, only if the de-
liverer can prove a non-negligent delivery. It must be
borne in mind that such a case as this can often involve
two innocent parties, but liability must be placed some-
where. Hence, since the receiver is in complete control of
the situs upon which the theft was committed, the presump-
tion of negligence is properly placed upon the receiver
because he would be in a better position to rebut the pre-
Ibid, 673. Italics supplied.
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sumption of negligence than the deliverer would be to
establish the receiver's negligent management of his place
of business. Also, considerable weight should attach to his
direction that delivery be made at his place of business.
There may be an alternative to basing the case on a pre-
sumption of negligence on the receiver's part. An outcome
favorable to the deliverer could also be achieved by holding
that possession and risk of loss shifted to the receiver at the
moment the goods were deposited on the premises of the
receiver, the action of the imposters being an interference
with the receiver's possession after the deliverer had com-
pleted the act of delivery. Such an approach would render
the question of the receiver's negligence immaterial. 2
Regardless of what the doctrinal basis for the case is,
the deliverer should be compelled to prove a non-negligent
delivery. The Court in the Galbraith case recognized this,
and sent the controversy back for a trial on one point:
"His (carrier) duty is to deliver the goods at the
proper place, and, of course, to take all proper care to
see that no unauthorized person receives them."'"
Brown was found free of negligence and there was no obli-
gation to specifically inquire as to the authority of the two
imposters. However, since he had previously been to the
Legum warehouse, his care would include knowledge of
any business procedure adopted by Legum. The honesty of
Brown was not questioned, but in the future a driver may
steal the goods himself and present the same testimony as
Brown and if he is believed, crime would pay. A literal
interpretation of this decision may be an impetus for fraud
or carelessness on the part of a deliverer whose word seems
to be final. The trial court wanted evidence of delivery
extrinsic to Brown's testimony. Did anyone see the truck
at the warehouse? Why should not the testimony of Legum's
clerks, who denied delivery, be believed?
Because of his view of the law as to what facts in this
situation were sufficient to establish delivery by Regal,
the trial judge was able to give judgment for Legum and
still say that he did not disbelieve any of the witnesses. If
the trial judge was confronted with the proposition that if
he believed Brown, he had to find for Regal, he might have
brought himself to choose between the two directly con-
flicting stories, and have given judgment for Legum on the
basis that Brown's story was less believable than that of
12 Note, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 1036 (1923).
2 K. B. 155, 157 (1922). Parenthetical material supplied.
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Legum's witnesses. Thus, perhaps, the case should have
been sent back to the trial court for it to reassess the ques-
tion of Brown's due care and his credibility in the light of
the correct principles of law.
ROBERT JAMES GERSTUNG
Discovery Of Documents And Property
Before Issued Joined
Eastern States Corp. v. Eisler'
Charles Eisler, the appellee stockholder, filed an
amended bill of complaint in The Circuit Court of Baltimore
City, alleging fraud and incompetency on the part of cor-
porate officials, and seeking the appointment of a receiver
to institute legal proceedings against said officials. Subse-
quently he filed a motion under Discovery Rule 4 of The
General Rules of Practice and Procedure2 for a court order
giving him access to records and documents in the posses-
sion of the appellant corporation. A few days later, the
appellant corporation filed a demurrer to the amended bill
of complaint. Prior to ruling upon this demurrer, the Chan-
cellor granted the motion and issued an order for discovery.
Appellant took an immediate appeal from the order so
entered,' contending, among other things, that the discovery
order could not be issued until after issue had been joined
in the proceeding.' Upon this contention, the Court of
Appeals held:
"... cases might conceivably arise where discovery
might be ordered before issue joined and this court
does not intend to hereby flatly rule that the remedy
of discovery as provided for by Rule 4, supra, should
never be granted until issue is joined, but the instant
case is not one of these."5
The Court of Appeals found the instant case not a proper
one for early discovery because discovery may only be
had if there is a genuine proceeding before the court. It
'181 Md. 526, 30 A. 2d 867 (1943).
G.R.P.P., Pt. Two, II, Rule 4.
"Note, Appealability of Denials of Motions to Implead and Related Dis-
cretionary Orders in Maryland, 12 Md. L. Rev. 145, 151 (1951), discusses
appealability of discovery orders and the reason for allowing the direct
appeal from the court order in the Instant case.
' A cause shall be deemed at issue upon the filing of the answer; Gen.
Eq. Rule 21.
'5Supra, n. 1, 534.
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